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The increase in the real price of  oil during 1973-74  is widely believed to 
have been a major cause of inflation in the United States and abroad. In 
part, this belief is based on a partial equilibrium (or adding-up) approach 
which explains the inflation rate as the weighted sum of the inflation rates 
of individual goods and services without making due allowance for the 
general equilibrium effects on factor prices of an increase in the relative 
price of an imported factor. But arguments acceptable theoretically can 
be  made  which attribute  inflation-or at least an upward price-level 
shift-to  factors decreasing the real quantity of  money demanded or 
increasing the nominal quantity of money supplied by the central banks. 
This chapter reports an empirical investigation of the magnitude of  these 
possible effects consistent with general equilibrium. 
First, a theoretical analysis of the long-run and short-run effects of  an 
oil price change is presented in section 8.1. It is  seen there that the 
long-run effect on real income and the real quantity of money demanded 
may be quite small, if  not negligible, particularly when real income is 
measured in terms of real GNP and money is deflated by the correspond- 
ing implicit deflator. While this result may be due to the use of a three- 
factor Cobb-Douglas production function in the context of a neoclassical 
growth model, it certainly illustrates that a long-run reduction of  real 
GNP of  even 1 or 2% is very much an empirical question. Short-run 
effects on real income and prices associated with shifts in  aggregate 
demand and supply appear to be similar in magnitude to those for the 
long run. Central banks’ reaction to the short-run real-income and infla- 
tion effects may offset or reinforce these effects once monetary policy is 
allowed to be endogenous. 
Tests of significance of oil price variables in an extended Lucas-Barro 
real income equation are reported in section 8.2. The results are mixed 
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and confounded by  price control and decontrol programs which were 
widespread at nearly the same time as the 1973-74 oil price change. Much 
future work is required to disentangle the effects of  these two factors 
definitively. 
Section 8.3 reports simulation experiments on the effects of the 1973- 
74 oil price change. These experiments are conducted using the Mark 
IV-FLT  Simulation Model presented in chapter 7 above. This model-a 
simplified version of the Mark I11 International Transmission Model'-is 
a quarterly macroeconomic model of  the United States, United King- 
dom, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Netherlands. In 
addition to the basic Mark IV-FLT  Model, an extended Mark IV-Oil 
Model is used which incorporates oil price variables in the real-income 
equations for those five countries for which the variables were found to be 
significant in section 8.2. Using the basic model, some notable effects are 
found as a result  of  induced movements in exports, exchange rates, 
money supplies, and the like. Stronger effects are simulated using the 
Mark IV-Oil  Model, but the price-control caveat of  section 8.2 again 
applies. 
The concluding section summarizes the results of  this chapter and 
suggests areas for future research as international data on the effects of 
the 1979-80 oil price increase become available. 
8.1  Theory 
The price level, measured in dollars per basket of goods, is the inverse 
of the price of money, goods per dollar. So it is convenient to classify the 
forces determining the price level according to whether they influence the 
supply of  or demand for money. 
A  standard  (long-run)  money-demand  function  explains  the  real 
quantity of  money demanded md by  real income y  and the nominal 
interest rate R.  The nominal quantity demanded Md  is the product of this 
real demand and the price level: 
(8.1)  Md=md(y,R) P. 
Equating money supply M" to money demand and solving for the price 
level, 
That is, the price level equals the ratio of the nominal quantity of money 
supplied to the real quantity of  money demanded. 
1. See Chapters 5 and 6 for details. 234  Chapter Eight 
Although the inflationary impact of  an oil price change is generally 
analyzed given an exogenously determined nominal money supply, this 
may be misleading or at least counterfactual. That is, to the extent that 
the oil price change increases the price level and unemployment (at least 
temporarily)  and  decreases  real income  for a  given  nominal  money 
supply, the inflationary effect would induce central banks to reduce M” 
while the recessionary effect tends to increase M”.  Which effect is domi- 
nant would depend on the relative weights the individual central bank 
puts on inflation  and unemployment.  In addition,  other factors-dis- 
cussed below-may  influence central bank policy response to an oil price 
change. With this warning, let us proceed for now to analyze the effects of 
an oil price change for an exogenous monetary policy. 
8.1.1  Long-Run (Full Employment) Effects 
Consider first the long-run effects of an oil price change on real output. 
For illustrative purposes suppose real output y is produced according to a 
three-factor Cobb-Douglas  production function using domestic capital k, 
labor C, and imported petroleum +:* 
(8.3)  y =  k“CP+Y, 
(8.4)  u+p+y=1. 
Let us assume that output is produced by competitors who treat all prices 
as parametric including in particular the real price of  oil 9.3  In equilib- 
2.  A  fuller specification would  include  a factor  e6+“ on the right-hand side,  but  it 
simplifies the notation without loss to choose labor units such that the es is eliminated and to 
incorporate technical progress T  into our measurement of labor in efficiency units. The basic 
results (8.8) and (8.12) below are statedinTatom (1979a, pp. 10-11) and Rasche and Tatom 
(1980) starting from the same production function (8.3). Their longest-run results (8.12), 
however, are derived from the simple assertion that the marginal product of  capital is fixed 
in the long run by supply conditions rather than as the result of a growth analysis as is done 
below.  Their  assertion-although  it  is  correct  in  this  case-is  generally  false.  They 
erroneously interpret the gross “rental price of  capital” which is equated to the marginal 
product of  capital as the “relative price of capital” (e.g. Tatom 1979a, pp. 10-11) and argue 
that this will equal its fixed supply price in the long run. In the appendix to Rasche and 
Tatom (1980),  they instead  have  attempted to relate  changes in  output to changes in 
capacity of  individual firms, but this seems to ignore the fact that the number of  firms is not 
fixed. 
In the main  body of  the paper, they present  evidence  supportive of  the usage of  a 
Cobb-Douglas  production  function  of  this  form  (8.3).  Kopcke  (1980) argues that it is 
improper to include energy as an argument in the aggregate production function since 
energy is itself an intermediate product produced by capital and labor. This objection does 
not apply to imported petroleum, which is produced by foreign labor and capital. Care must 
be taken, as seen below, however, in going from the domesticoutput concept appropriate to 
the production function (8.3) to the value-added concept of real GNP. Unfortunately this 
last step has not been made in the three-factor analyses of the effects of oil price changes. 
3.  This assumption is arguable also. For example, Phelps (1978) treated the quantity of 
imported oil 4 as  determined erogenously; the nominal price of  oil is assumed fixed by Mork 
and Hall (1979) and by Berner et al. (1977) in their multicountry model. Rasche and Tatom 
(1980) argue persuasively that neither of  these representations  captures the meaning of 
OPEC’s ability to set an optimal real price of  oil. 235  Importance of  Oil Price Changes in the 1970s World Inflation 
rium, one of  the first-order conditions requires that the marginal product 
of  petroleum be equated to its real price: 
It is straightforward to solve for the equilibrium usage of petroleum as a 
function of  8, k, and C: 
If we now substitute this equilibrium +  into the production function (8.3), 
we obtain equilibrium real output as a function of  the real price of oil and 
given, fully employed resources of  capital and labor: 
(8.7) 
Taking logarithms and differentiating, we find the elasticity of  equilib- 
rium output with respect to the real oil price for given capital and labor 
resources: 
-  Y-  Y  -  - 
(8.8)  :;:;;lk,e  cw+p  1-y' 
If, for example, y were on the order of  0.01, a 1%  increase in the real oil 
price would decrease real output by only 0.01% (1  basis point) for given 
resources and given the assumptions of this ill~stration.~ 
The full, long-run equilibrium effect would be slightly larger due to a 
reduction in the steady-state capital-labor ratio for a given growth path of 
labor. To see this, suppose that saving and investment  R  is a constant 
fraction u  of  domestic factor income: 
(8.9)  L = u(y  -  e+). 
Dividing both sides of  (8.9) by k and noting that y -  84 = (a  + P)y, 
(8.10) 
-  k  = u(a  + PI;. 
k 
Thus the growth rate of capital is a fixed proportion of  the output-capital 
ratio. In view of  (8.7), this latter ratio is 
4. The value of y is discussed at some length below. To the extent that capital is in the 
form of  existing  machines which cannot be  readily  modified  and which require  fixed 
petroleum  inputs, the quasi rents of existing machines will fall without any reduction in 
output or petroleum usage. A possibly offsetting factor would be the premature obsoles- 
cence of  machines on which the quasi rents fall below zero. Neither of  these factors is 
operative in full long-run equilibrium discussed immediately below, and the two factors are 
taken as negligible on net here. 236  Chapter Eight 
(8.11) 
The simple neoclassical growth model can therefore be applied, which, 
after tedious manipulations, yields the result that 
(8.12) 
This effect, which allows for the (proportionate) reduction in the capital 
stock, would be about a third larger than that in (8.8) for given resources 
and a labor share equal to three-quarters of value added. We should note 
that  since income and capital fall proportionately in  full steady-state 
equilibrium, there is no long-run effect on the real interest rate.5 
A curiosity of national income accounting proves important in applying 
the analysis to empirical data. Gross national product is a value-added 
concept  so that  imported inputs are subtracted from  total  output  to 
obtain GNP. This works fine for nominal GNP or Q: 
(8.13)  Q=PY-(PB)+=P(l-y)y. 
So nominal GNP is simply the price of output P times real domestic factor 
income (1 -  y)y. However, in computing real GNP or q,  imported inputs 
are valued at base-year relative prices 8: 
(8.14) 
Thus measured real GNP rises relative to factor income (1 -  y)y  when 
the real oil price 0 is increased. Nominal aggregate demand as measured 
by nominal GNP is not affected since there is an offsetting measurement 
error in the measured GNP deflator D: 
We can differentiate (8.14) to find the elasticity of  real GNP with 
respect to the real oil price as 
(8.16) 
5. Before capital adjusts, but with resources fully employed, the marginal product of 
capital ak"-'tp+Y falls (slightly) with Q  and hence so does the real interest rate. 237  Importance of  Oil Price Changes in the 1970s World Inflation 
For small changes in 0 before the capital stock adjusts,6 
=o.  (8.17)  -Y 
Thus we see that in the neighborhood of the original oil price, the output 
effect  is  completely masked  in  measured  GNP.  However, for  large 
changes in 0 relative toe  such as those occurring in 1973-74, there would 
be a negative effect on measured real GNP.'  Using A  for the change 
relative to base-year prices we have 
where 
d 1%  Y 
d log 0 
is from (8.8) or (8.12) depending on whether or not the capital stock is 
presumed to have adjusted.' Note that the deflator is decreased relative 
to the price of  output by 
just as real GNP is increased relative to real factor incomes. 
In summary, an increase in the real price of oil is predicted to decrease 
real  output by  the logarithmic change times yl(1 -  y) before  capital 
adjusts or times y/P when capital is fully adjusted. However, such an oil 
price change will cause a partially offsetting overstatement of measured 
real GNP (and understatement of  the GNP deflator). 
Obviously the values of  y and  P are of  considerable interest. For 
current illustrative purposes, only petroleum imports will be c~nsidered.~ 
To the extent that petroleum imports are for resale to consumers rather 
than used in production, they have no effect on output or measured GNP 
(real or nominal). Thus the ratio of  the value of  petroleum imports to 
GNP serves as an upper limit on y.  If  we use prechange U.S. data, this 
6.  That is, 8=e  so that yG/(O  -ye)  = y/(l -  y). 
7.  Although (d log q)/(d  log 8) = 0 initially as seen in (8.17), as 8  increases, the positive 
RHS term in (8.16) decreases while the negative RHS is unchanged. The negative effect is 
yet greater if  capital is allowed to adjust. 
8.  Note that the first RHS term in  (8.18)  is approximately  equal  (for small y) to 
y(1 -  (We)),  which illustrates that as 8  becomes large the adjustment for imported inputs in 
measured GNP becomes trivial and all output is included in measured GNP. 
9.  It is possible to apply the analysis to energy more generally, but the increase in y is 
largely offset by  a reduced logarithmic change in 8. 238  Chapter Eight 
upper limit would be about 0.003 for 1970. In 1976, this share had risen to 
0.02. This rise in the share could indicate inelastic consumer demand for 
imported petroleum products, a problem with the Cobb-Douglas produc- 
tion function, or both. So while 0.003 should be an upper limit for y if the 
Cobb-Douglas function is correct, 0.02 will  also be considered as an 
upper-upper limit. Finally suppose that d(a  + p) and p/(a  + p) have 
their  traditionally estimated values of  Y4  and %.  Then the multiplier 
-y/(l -  y) is  -0.003  or -0.020  depending on y. The corresponding 
multipliers allowing for capital stock change are -  0.004 and -0.027, The 
real price of  a barrel of crude oil increased some 3.57fold from 19731  to 
19741 (a logarithmic increase of  1.273). This is surely an upper limit on 
0/6  for all petroleum products. Table 8.1 presents estimates of  the max- 
imum effects on output and measured real GNP. We see that the max- 
imum full adjustment effects on real output range from a decrease of 0.5 
to 3.5% according to whether  one takes a prechange  or postchange 
estimate of  y. For measured real GNP the corresponding decreases are 
only 0.3 to 2.0%. Even smaller changes correspond to the intermediate 
period corresponding to full employment of resources but no adjustment 
of  the capital stock. 
Rasche and Tatom have long argued  for much larger real-income 
effects of the oil price change. They rely upon regression estimates of the 
quasi-production function (8.7) and find much larger values of  y than 
considered here. Part of  that difference is illusory: They use a much 
broader energy price index which has a logarithmic increase of only 0.408 
from 1972 to 1974'"  compared to the 1.273  increase for a barrel of oil used 
here; so the larger elasticity is offset by a lower value of log(0/8). Further 
they do not take account of the biases in reported real GNP so that their 
estimates may  refer to the output effect rather than the GNP effect. 
Finally, in their (1980) paper, they report an equation (6) in which they 
estimate the production function (8.3) directly (after taking logs) and also 
add log 0 separately. The estimated y is 0.05 while the coefficient on log 0 
is -0.07.  Using y = 0.05, p = 0.70 (as reported), and log(0/8) = 0.408, 
we get an output change of  -0.0215  with no capital adjustment and of 
-0.0291  with capital adjustment, which is in the same ball park as the 
figures in table 8.1. It is the things other than in the production function- 
captured in the log 0 coefficient of  -0.07-which  permit such big esti- 
mates. These other things may have to do with cyclical factors, induced 
monetary policy, or fortuitous removal of  price controls at roughly the 
same time as discussed below. Further the 0.05 estimate of  y may be 
biased upward if  energy usage (relative to capital and labor) serves as an 
indicator of  whether the economy is in a boom or recession. Thus the 
Rasche and Tatom conclusions may have weak empirical foundations. 
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Table 8.1  Illustrative Calculations of Maximum Long-Run 
Effect of  1973-74 Real Oil Price Increase 
No Capital Adjustment  Full Capital Adjustment 
y = 0.003  y = 0.02  y = 0.003  y = 0.02 
Change in 
log output 




(A 1%  4)  -0.0017  -0.0114  -0.0029  -  0.0200 
Difference 
(A log 4 - A log y 
A log P - A log D)  0.0022  0.0146  0.0022  0.0146 
This exercise has shown that even a huge change in the real price of oil 
such as in 1973-74 may result in very small if not negligible effects on real 
output and especially upon measured real GNP. Different assumptions 
would result in different results, but the model used is surely a standard 
one in practice. Thus it would appear to be an empirical question as to 
whether the oil price change had any significant long-run effect on mea- 
sured real GNP. 
We can now return to our original question of the long-run effect of the 
oil price change on the real quantity of  money demanded and hence, 
given the nominal money supply, on the price level. First, we note that in 
long-run equilibrium real income is reduced by a constant fraction but the 
growth rate of  real income is reduced only temporarily during the tran- 
sitional period. Second, we note that the real interest rate is unchanged. 
Under these conditions, in long-run equilibrium the real and nominal 
interest rate will be unchanged and the real quantity of money demanded 
will  behave similarly to real income-a  downward parallel shift in its 
growth path. The logarithmic downward shift will equal the elasticity of 
real money demand with respect to real income times the logarithmic 
shift in real income. Thus, if  this income elasticity is around 1,  there will 
be a long-run increase in the price level equal to the long-run decrease in 
real income."  If  during  the early part  of  the adjustment period  the 
price-level effect exceeds this long-run effect, then the inflation rate must 
be reduced (ceteris paribus) below what it would otherwise be to reach 
long-run equilibrium. 
Two problems may arise in econometric work based on real GNP as 
11.  A formal solution to this problem is presented  in Darby (1979, chapter 5). 240  Chapter Eight 
measured in the national income accounts. First, the reduction in mea- 
sured real GNP will understate  the output reduction  which  actually 
occurs.  A second problem  arises only if  the income elasticity of  the 
demand for money differs significantly from unity: Then the offsetting 
measurement errors in real GNP and the GNP deflator would cause an 
apparent shift in the money-demand function equal to the product of the 
measurement error and the difference of the elasticity from 1. This latter 
problem is a second-order matter which will not be pursued further in this 
chapter. 
8.1.2  Short-Run Effects 
Short-run effects of the 1973-74 oil price shock have been analyzed in 
terms of induced shifts in aggregate demand and aggregate supply curves 
under the assumption that nominal wages are predetermined (or at least 
sticky) in the short run. As with the long-run analysis, the analysis of the 
short-run  effects proceeds  on the assumption that  the  government’s 
monetary and fiscal policy is unaffected by  the  unexpected oil price 
increase. 
The aggregate demand effects of  an oil price shock can be viewed as 
analogous to that of an increase in taxes.I2  Assume for simplicity that in 
the short run both producer and consumer demands for imported pe- 
troleum are perfectly inelastic. For producers, this means that higher 
import prices will be paid out of  reduced quasi rents, reducing private 
income. For consumers, higher oil prices would directly reduce expendi- 
tures on other consumption goods for given private income and these 
expenditures would  be  further reduced  by  the  reduction  of  private 
income.I3  Thus, at initial levels of  real income and interest rates, aggre- 
gate expenditures would fall unless increased demand for exports by oil 
exporters equals or exceeds the induced reduction in consumption. When 
we allow for some elasticity of demand for imported oil and for increased 
exports of  goods to oil producers, the plausible magnitude  of  these 
basically distributional  effects is sharply reduced  and could even  be 
reversed.l4  In what follows, we shall nonetheless consider the possibility 
of  a small decrease in aggregate demand. 
The aggregate supply effect would appear more substantial and has 
been analyzed on varying assumptions by Bruno and Sachs (1979), Hud- 
12. This tax analysis is given little if any weight in recent analyses. Rasche and Tatom 
(1980), for example, term it the “1974 view,” and the belief that aggregate demand shifts 
were important appears  to have been an ephemeral phenomenon. It is included here for the 
sake of  completeness. 
13. The exact amount of these reductions depends on consumer expectations, but the 
direction is unambiguous. 
14. There  is  no long-run effect  on  output or  interest rates via  this  channel  unless 
differences between foreign and domestic propensities to save cause a shift in the domestic 
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son and Jorgenson (1978), Mork and Hall (1979), Norsworthy, Harper, 
and Kunze (1979), Phelps (1978), and Rasche and Tatom (1977a, 1980). 
Following the  latter  authors,  suppose  that  the  short-run  conditions 
underlying the aggregate supply curve are fixity of the capital stock, the 
nominal wage W, and the real price of  oil. Using the aggregate produc- 
tion function (8.3), one can readily derive output as 
(8.19) 
On comparing (8.19) and (8.7), we note that for a given price level there 
is a much greater output effect with nominal wages fixed than when labor 
is assumed to be at its natural unemployment rate. Specifically 
(8.20) 
Note that the elasticity of the aggregate supply curve is 
(8.21) 
It is convenient to plot aggregate supply and demand curves in terms of 
log y and log P so that slopes and elasticities have a simple correspon- 
dence. The logarithmic aggregate supply curve corresponding to equa- 
tion (8.19) is 
(8.22)  1  + 2  log y + log k 
a 
-  -log  Y  0 + -log  P  P. 
a!  01 
This is plotted as S  in figure 8.1  for given values of k, W,  and the base-year 
relative price of oil 3. The slope of S is the inverse (a@)  of the elasticity of 
aggregate supply. An aggregate demand curve D is also drawn to deter- 
mine short-run output and the price level, 7 and ,.I5 
As can be seen in equation (8.22) an increase in the real price of  oil 
shifts the aggregate supply curve horizontally by  -  (y/a)  log(0/8), as 
illustrated in figure 8.2.16  This can alternatively be described as an upward 
shift equal to minus the slope of S times the horizontal shift: 
(8.23) 
15. The aggregate demand curve is derived by solving the IS relation forR and substitut- 
16. A negative sign indicates a shift to the left. 
ing in equation (8.2). 242  Chapter Eight 
log 9 
Fig. 8.1  Determination of  base output and price level. 
If any shift in the aggregate demand curve is negligible, the new equilib- 
rium output and price level are y and P. The short-run displacement in 
output from that corresponding to the base real oil price e is 
(8.24) 
Fig. 8.2 
1%  Y  log 5 
Determination of  changes in output and price level from base 
values with no aggregate-demand shift. 243  Importance of  Oil Price Changes in the 1970s World Inflation 
where qD  is the elasticity of  the aggregate demand curve so that a/p  and 
l/qD  are the slopes of  the aggregate supply and demand curves, respec- 
tively.  Suppose  that  the  aggregate  demand  curve  is  unit  elastic 
(qD  = -1);  then 
(8.25)  Alogy= --  iog(e/8), 
1-Y 
which is identical to the long-run effect implied by (8.8)  before the capital 
stock adjusts. The increase in the price level, 
(8.26) 
reduces real wages just sufficiently  to maintain employment at  the natural 
level. Thus, in the absence of  a shift in the aggregate demand curve, 
employment rises or falls (and output is greater or less than the given- 
capital  long-run  level  indicated  by  (8.25)) according  to whether the 
elasticity of  aggregate demand is smaller or greater than 1 in absolute 
value. If  aggregate demand were inelastic, increased employment would 
lessen the short-run decline in output. In Darby (1976c, pp. 161-63)  I 
argued that short-run and hence transitory movements in output will 
induce  much less than proportionate movements  in  money  demand, 
which  suggests that the short-run  aggregate demand curve is in  fact 
elastic.” This would imply a short-run reduction in employment, which 
would  accentuate  the  initial  fall  in  output  predicted  by  the  full- 
employment analysis.  Once expected nominal wages are reduced,’  this 
17.  Purvis (1975) displays the correct formula for qD,  which is 
-1 
TLJ = 
J log md 
J logy  J log R 
J log md ’ 
+ +- 
where +is  (d log R)/(d  logy)  or the elasticity  of the interest rate with respect to output  on the 
IS curve. For a normal negatively sloped IS curve, +(a  log rnd)/(a  log R) will be positive but 
insufficient to bring the denominator of qD  up to 1  if short-run interest elasticity of  money 
demand is small and the IS curve is rather flat as argued by Hall (1977). 
Rasche and Tatom (1980) make a convoluted version of  Gamb’s error (which Purvis 
corrected) to conclude that the aggregate demand curve was inelastic. Rather than accept 
the implication of  increased employment, they repeat their (1977a) assumption that nomi- 
nal wages rise freely once the natural unemployment rate is reached. I can see no justifica- 
tion for this appendage to  a basic search view of the labor market. It is of  course irrelevant if 
qD  < -  1  or the aggregate demand  curve shifts to the left sufficiently to reduce employment 
despite an inelastic aggregate demand curve. 
18. If the elasticity of  aggregate demand is less than -  1 but greater than -  p/(p -  a) 
(about -  1.5), the short-run effect will be greater than the full-employment  effect for a given 
capital stock but less than the long-run effect allowing for capital adjustment. That is, in the 
absence of  significant shifts in aggregate demand, the long-run effects with  full capital 
adjustment such as calculated in table 8.1 exceed the short-run effects unless qD  < -  p/ 
(p -  a)  = -1.5. 244  Chapter Eight 
log Y  log? 
Fig. 8.3  Determination of  changes in output and price level from base 
values with shift in aggregate demand. 
difference would  disappear.  In addition, the aggregate demand curve 
may shift to the left as previously argued if there is a distributional effect 
due to faster  decreases in  consumer  spending  than increases  in oil- 
exporter spending; this is illustrated in figure 8.3. 
Again it must be emphasized that these calculations are only illustra- 
tive of  the sort of  effects which might be expected. If, for example, we 
assumed partial adjustment of nominal wages to their equilibrium values, 
the aggregate supply curve would be less elastic and the output change 
would be more closely tied to the change in the given-capital long-run 
level of  output.  j9 
The aggregate demand curve is derived using our price-level equation 
(8.2) so the short-run price-level effect 
(8.27) 
is valid for the short-run period in which IS-LM analysis is applicable. If 
-l/-qD  is less than the long-run elasticity of  demand for money with 
respect to output, the short-run increase in the price level would be less 
than that associated with an equal long-run decrease in output. 
Note that the same accounting problem in relating output and the price 
level to real GNP and the deflator apply in the short  run as in the long run. 
19.  More wage flexibility implies less employment variation, so output would be lower 
than indicated by equation (8.24) if  qo  > -  1 and less if  q,,  < -  1. 245  Importance of Oil Price Changes in the 1970s World Inflation 
8.1.3  Endogenous Monetary Policy 
The time has now  come to consider effects of  the oil shock upon 
monetary policy. Suppose that we can write the money supply reaction 
function of  the monetary authorities as 
(8.28)  log M = log M* + h,log(y/y*) 
f  hp  log(P/P*) +  EM. 
In logarithms,  actual money equals expected money as predicted  by 
lagged variables systematically affecting central bank behavior plus nega- 
tive coefficients times the innovations in output and the price level and a 
random disturbance.2"  Write the semireduced forms for output and the 
price level as 
(8.29)  y =  f (k,  w  B,M, M*  >  9 
(8.30) 
Denote the real-oil-price and money elasticities of these equations by fe, 
fM, no,  and nM.  Then taking the log changes in equations (8.28) through 
(8.30) and solving for A log M yields 
P = n(k  ,  W,  6,  M,  M*,  E~). 
(8.31) 
We have seen above that fe  is negative and ne  is positive while h, and hp 
are both negative. Whether money is increased, decreased, or left un- 
changed by  the central bank depends both on the relative sizes of  the 
output and price effects and on the relative aversion of the central bank to 
recession and inflation. The denominator of (8.31) allows for attenuation 
of  money changes to the extent that there are within-period (positive) 
responses in output and prices. Finally, the price-level effect is obtained 
by substituting (8.31) into the log-change form of  (8.30): 
(8.32) 
Here ne  is the value of (A log P)/(A log 6) such as is computed in (8.27) for 
a  given  nominal  money  supply and  the ratio  term is  the  additional 
(ambiguously signed) effect due to endogenous nominal money supply 
changes. 
20. The lack of a term in the balance of payments implies that we are dealing with either a 
reserve country (the U.S.), a freely floating country, or  a country which can and does 
sterilize balance-of-payments effects in the relevant period; see chapter 10. By the time of 
the first oil shock (1973-74) this is probably a reasonable characterization although current 
balance-of-payments effects will  also be present for  some countries in  the  simulations 
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Simulation experiments which allow for such endogenous movements 
in the nominal money supply are reported below in section 8.3. It  is 
perhaps understandable why most analyses assume that the ambiguously 
signed change in nominal money must be negligible and proceed on that 
basis. One can at least explain the effect if the central bank were to hold 
money supply unchanged. 
8.1.4  Conclusions from Theory 
Considering first the results of  our analysis conditional upon a given 
monetary policy, with resources at their natural employment levels, the 
output elasticity with respect to the real price of oil is -  y/(l -  y) before 
capital adjusts and -  y/p  with full capital adjustment. The parameter y, 
the value share of oil imports used in producing domestic output ,  may be 
quite small, certainly less than 0.02 for the United States, for example. 
The labor share p is on the order of 0.7 to 0.8, so the long-run elasticities 
vary from about y to 1.3y or 1.4~.  In the short run, unemployment will 
increase slightly (if aggregate demand is elastic), but the short-run output 
elasticity seems to lie in the same range as for the long run. The price level 
is shifted up in the long run by the long-run income elasticity of money 
demand (around 1) times the output elasticity. In the short run the price 
level shifts less than in proportion to output since the short-run aggregate 
demand curve is elastic. 
These shifts in the levels of output and prices affect their growth rates 
only during the transitional period. They may be reinforced or offset by 
endogenous money supply reactions of the central bank. These reactions 
depend on the relative aversion of the central bank to decreases in output 
and increases in prices and so are ambiguous in sign a priori. 
Biases in the calculation of real value added imply smaller elasticities in 
absolute value for real GNP and the implicit price deflator than for real 
output and the price level. Indeed, an increase in the real oil price of the 
size which occurred in 1973-74  implies that the logarithmic change in real 
GNP would be less than half that for output. 
8.2  Tests for Structural Change in the Real-Income Equation 
The behavior of  the real price of  oil is dominated by  a downward 
secular trend from the 1950s until the early 1970s as illustrated for the 
United  States in  figure 8.4.  There was a small upward movement in 
1971-72,  but the major increase occurred in the second quarter of  1973 
and especially the first quarter of 1974. Widespread recessions in 1973-75 
provide the major empirical evidence in support of  a large real-income 
effect of  oil price increases. However,  several alternative hypotheses 
focus on other major events occurring roughly coincidentally. 
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Fig. 8.4  The logarithm of the United States real price of imported oil. 
Source: The dollar price index of Venezuelan crude oil is taken 
from various  issues of  International  Financial Statistics  and 
rebased to 1.00 in 1970. This is then deflated by the US.  GNP 
deflator (1970 = 1.00) to obtain 0 
of  pegged exchange rates in  1973 which  permitted (previously) non- 
reserve countries to regain control of their money supplies and to stop the 
inflation imported from the United States. In the United States, mean- 
while, the Fed reduced money supply growth in mid-1973 and again in 
mid-1974. The average reduction in the growth rate of  the money supply 
in  the eight countries in  our sample  exceeded  5 percentage points. 
Obviously any estimate of the effect of oil price changes must account for 
the effect of  these restrictive monetary shocks. 
A second alternative hypothesis points to the widespread adoption of 
price controls, following the U.S. lead in August 1971, and their subse- 
quent dismantling in the period 1973-75.  Such controls may have caused 
overstatement of  real GNP (and understatement of  the GNP deflator) 
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compared to true values.*' When the controls were relaxed during 1973- 
75, measured real income fell back to its true value giving an illusion of a 
deeper recession than was actually occurring or the occurrence of  a 
recession when there was none. Although it is possible to develop cor- 
rected estimates for real GNP and the deflator using physical unit series 
such as employment, car-loadings, and components  of  the industrial 
production indices, that is a very large job. The present paper will only 
examine whether estimated effects of  oil price changes appear to be 
larger in those countries with coincident price-control relaxation. If  so, 
future research will be indicated to disentangle these oil and price-control 
effects. 
In examining the empirical data, it is also important to note that the 
normal or natural growth rate of  output has declined generally in the 
postwar period. In the late 1940s, after a decade and a half of depression 
and war, the world capital-labor ratio was very low relative to its bal- 
anced-growth or steady-state value.22  As the capital stock approaches its 
steady-state level, the growth rates of  capital and hence real income 
decline toward their steady-state values. If we were to impose a constant 
natural growth, a spurious negative coefficient might be estimated for oil 
to account for slowing growth in the 1970s. 
The real GNP equations of  the Mark 111 International Transmission 
Model provide a convenient starting place for estimating the effect on 
output of changes in the real price of  These equations were derived, 
following Barro (1978), by combining a standard Lucas (1973) aggregate 
supply function with an aggregate demand function with nominal money, 
real government spending, and real exports as arguments. Specifically, 
they express the rational-expectation/natural-rate approach as 
where the time subscripts are made explicit, y, is the natural-employment 
level of  real output in quarter t,  and &I,,  g,, and i,  are the innovations in 
the aggregate demand variables log M,, logarithm of  real government 
21.  See Darby (1976a, b). 
22.  Even for the relativelyunscathed United States, capital grew by only about 0.4%  per 
annum from 1929 through 1948 compared to a normal growth rate of  3.2%;  see Christensen 
and Jorgenson (1978, p. 56). This implies that by 1948 the actual U.S. capital stock was less 
than 60% of the steady-state capital stock. 
23.  See chapters 5 and 6 above for a description of the model and chapter 9 below for a 
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expenditures  for  goods  and  services,  and  exports divided by  GNP, 
respecti~ely.~~  Thus, in the absence of  innovations or stochastic distur- 
bance E,, log yt adjusts toward its natural level at the rate u2 per quarter. 
Innovations in the determinants of  aggregate demand affect logy, with an 
unconstrained  four-quarter distributed  lag to allow for any inventory 
adjustment lags. 
To estimate the effect of  the real oil price, it remains to specify log y, 
appropriately. A form which allows for both declining natural output 
growth as just discussed and for an oil price effect is 
(8.34) 
A positive b2 and negative b3  implies a declining natural growth rate. The 
parameter b4 estimates the full long-run value of (d  log y)l(d log 8). If  the 
expression (8.34) were simply substituted in equation (8.34), an oil price 
change would implicitly  be assumed to have no immediate effect and then 
a partial adjustment effect at the rate u2 per quarter. This is inconsistent 
with the analysis of  section 8.1 in which it was shown that the short-run 
effect is similar in magnitude to the long-run effect.25  So, as with the 
aggregate demand variables, a four-quarter distributed lag on the first 
difference of  log 8 is included to capture a rapid short-run adjustment 
process. 
Substituting equation (8.34) in (8.33) and adding the short-run adjust- 
ment process yields the estimating equation 
log 7,  = bl + b2t + b3t2 + b410g 8,. 
(8.35)  1%  Yt =  a1 + az(b1 -  b2) + (1 -  a2)log Yr-  1 
+ a2b2t + u2b3(t -  1)2 
4 
This equation has been estimated using the 1957-76  quarterly data set 
and instruments for the eight countries in the Mark I11  International 
Transmission Model. The regressions are based on the two-stage least- 
squares principal-components (2SLSPC) technique because of the large 
24. The scaling of  exports as a fraction of  income rather than in logarithmic terms was 
done to permit application of the balance-of-payments  identity in the model. In the results 
reported here all the innovations are defined as residuals from optimal ARIMA processes 
applied to log M,,  log g,, and (X/Y),,  respectively. 
25.  Immediately after an increase in the real oil price, the capital stock is greater than in 
full long-run  equilibrium while labor utilization is less. The net effect depends on the 
elasticity qD  of  the aggregate demand curve, but approximates the full long-run effect on 
plausible assumptions. 250  Chapter Eight 
number of predetermined variables in the  The coefficients  of the 
aggregate demand variables, not at issue here, are substantially the same 
as those discussed in chapter 6 above, and so are omitted for the sake of 
brevity from the present discus~ion.~’ 
The regression results are summarized in table 8.2. The coefficient of 
log 9,  is negative in every case although only four of  the t statistics meet 
conventional levels of significance. The implicit estimate of the long-run 
oil effect is reported in the ninth row as ranging from a 2 basis point 
decrease in real income per percentage point increase in the real price of 
oil for the U.S.  to 19 basis points for Japan. Table 8.3 indicates the 
implied long-run reduction in real income for the eight contries based on 
the 19731-761V  increase in the real price of oil. Rasche and Tatom (1980, 
table 7) prepared similar estimates for their model (discussed in section 
8.1) on the basis of  1973-77 energy price increases, and those estimates 
are reported  for comparison.  Despite some differences in  detail, the 
calculations here tell broadly the same story as those of  Rasche and 
Tatom. However, this strong story does not  do so well  under closer 
examination. 
Let us first consider the possibility that the share of imported oil in total 
output is so small that any effects are in fact negligible. This is tested by 
computing the F statistic for the hypothesis that all the oil coefficients  are 
zero (Ho:  ~2b4  = c1 = c2 = c3 = c4 = 0). As reported in table 8.2, only 
five of the countries have any statistically significant oil effect at the 5% 
level2*  and for one of these (the United States) the significant response is 
due to short-run movements which might be related to various panic 
policy responses,  briefly adopted here and abroad, to the temporary 
OPEC embargo at the end of 1973. Further, the significant French effects 
imply that French income was higher throughout 1973 as a result of rising 
oil prices and so does not really support the hypothesis. 
Since experience indicates that the French, Italian, and Japanese data 
may be quite ~nreliable,~~  let us focus on the results for the United States, 
the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, and the Netherlands. Of these 
five, the F statistic is insignificant for Canada and Germany and signifi- 
cant for the United States, United Kingdom, and the Netherlands. In- 
26.  The only current endogenous variables in equation (8.35) are idr,  .& and log 0,. Time 
t and government spending shocks are exogenous in the model, but idr  and fr  are endoge- 
nous. The price of oil in base-year dollars is exogenous, so log  8, is exogenous for the U.S. 
For the other seven countries endogenous movements in the purchasing power ratio make 
the real price of  oil in base-year domestic currency units endogenous, but they are domi- 
nated by movements in the U.S. real price. 
27. To the extent  that these aggregate demand  variables  were correlated  with  any 
significant oil variables added here, their numerical values were of course affected. How- 
ever, the general pattern and conclusions remained unaltered from those in chapter 6. See 
also the simulation equation coefficients in section 8.3 below. 
28.  Only France is significant at the 1%  level. 
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terestingly, these three countries with significant F statistics all removed 
general price controls coincidentally with the 1973-74 oil price increase 
while Canada and Germany had no price controls during the relevant 
period.30  If, as I have argued elsewhere (1976a, b), the decontrol process 
results in the elimination of  overstatement of real GNP built up during 
the control period, then the spurious drop in reported real GNP relative 
to true GNP will be captured as part (or all!) of  the effect of  the coin- 
cidental increase in real oil prices. Certainly the pattern of significant oil 
effects only where simultaneous decontrol occurred strongly indicates the 
value of  research to formulate real GNP estimates unbiased by price- 
control evasions which overstate quantities and understate prices. 
In summary, these empirical results give a rather ambiguous answer to 
the question of whether a large increase in the real price of oil will reduce 
real income significantly for given nominal money supplies, real govern- 
ment spending, and real exports. Such a reduction is estimated for half 
the cases, but this may be a spurious result due to the simultaneous 
removal of price controls in those countries. 
8.3  Simulation Experiments 
To assess the effects of the 1973-74 oil price increase on real income- 
and ultimately the price level-we  must allow for induced changes in 
nominal money supplies and real exports aside from any possible direct 
effects such as examined in section 8.2. To take account of these indirect 
effects, one must resort to a simulation model of  some sort, and this 
section reports results from the Mark IV Simulation Model described in 
chapter 7 above.3i The results of  any one simulation model cannot be 
30. The United States took the lead in imposing price controls in August 1971, which 
Darby (1976a, b)  argues led to an increasing overstatement of  real GNP (and understate- 
ment of the deflator) through the first quarter of  1973. Controls were then relaxed in phases 
through the third quarter of  1974 with progressive elimination of  overstatement  in real 
GNP. That is, real-income growrh was overstated from 1971111 through  19731 and then 
understated from 197311 through  1974IV. According  to  Parkin  in  Shenoy (1978, pp. 
150-51), the United Kingdom followed a similar pattern: controls instituted with a freeze in 
November 1972 peaked in their effect on the data with the end of stage I1  in August 1973 and 
eventually were abandoned entirely after the Conservative loss of  February 1974. Shenoy 
(1978, pp.  132-35)  reports a similar albeit more complex pattern for the  Netherlands 
beginning also with a 1972 price freeze. Carr (1976, p. 40) points out that Canada was free of 
general price  controls until  October 1975, too late to cause any biases in the oil price 
coefficients.  West Germany imposed no price controls on the ground that such policies 
distract attention from the real problems (Shenoy 1978, pp. 138-41). 
31. The Mark IV Simulation Model is a simplified simulation version of  the Mark 111 
International Transmission Model described in chapters  5 and 6 above. The main simplifica- 
tions involve (1) deletion of insignificant variables except where they are required apriori to 
permit international transmission and (2) combining variables to reduce multicollinearity 
where a priori hypotheses on equality of  coefficients were not rejected by the data. The 
resulting model is thus both consistent with the data and tractable for simulation. The  Mark 
IV Model exists in versions corresponding to pegged and floating exchange rates, but only 
the latter (Mark IV-FLT)  is used in this paper since we are concerned with 1973-74. Table 8.2  ZSLSPC Regression Estimates of Oil Price Effects in Real-Income Equation (8.35) 
us  UK  CA  FR  GE  IT  JA  NE 
Adjustment  0.180 
coefficient (aZ)  (0.049) 
3.656 
Coefficient of 
t  0.00  196 
(0.00058) 
3.349 
-  3.215  (t -  1)2 x 10-6' 
(3.389) 
-0.949 
1%  0,- 1  -  0.0038 
(0.0052) 
-  0.732 
A log 0,  -0.021 
(0,011) 
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Note.  Period:  19711-76IV.  Standard errors are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates; t statistics are below standard errors. Coefficient 
estimates for the constant and the aggregate demand shocks (a3,  . . . ,  uI4)  are not reported for brevity's sake. 
'Note  that the coefficients and standard errors in the third row are a multiple  lo6 of  those for (t - 1)'. 
$The  F(5,59) statistic is for the test of the hypothesis that ~2b4  = c1 = c2 = cg = c4 = 0. The 0.05 significance  level (indicated by $) requires F> 2.23. The 
0.01 significance level (indicated by #) requires F > 3.34. 
'+The biased Durbin-Watson  statistic is reported in square brackets in those cases in which Durbin's h  cannot be computed (is imaginary). 254  Chapter Eight 
Table 8.3  Implied Estimates of Long-Run Decrease in Real GNP 
due to 19731-76IV Increases in Real Price of Oil 
Rasche-Tatom 
d log qt  log @19761V  Long-Run  Long-Run 









~~  ~~~ 
-0.021 
-0.057 
-  0.047 
-0.095 
-  0.039 
-0.035 











-  7.3% 
-5.2% 
-  10.9% 
-4.3% 
-4.9% 
-  21.8% 





-  1.9% 
NA 
NA 
-  17.1% 
'This  is the ratio of the estimated values of  a2b4  to a2 from table 8.2. 
'Product  of  the previous two columns. 
*From Rasche and Tatom (1980, table 7 for 1973-77  energy-price increases. 
taken too seriously except as they illustrate the possible importance of 
channels not inconsistent with the data which might otherwise be over- 
looked. So, with a spirit of healthy skepticism, let us turn to the specific 
experiments. 
To assess the effects of the oil price increase, we compare the results 
from simulating the model in one case with the actual real price of oil and 
in another case with the real price of oil held constant at the 19731 price. 
The assumed difference in the logarithm of the real price of oil (log (O/e)) 
is  plotted in figure 8.5. The dynamic simulations begin in 197311 and 
continue for six quarters thereafter.32 
In view of the mixed evidence for direct oil price effects on real income 
as reported in section 8.2, the basic Mark IV Model does not incorporate 
such effects. An alternative simulation model, the Mark IV-Oil,  was 
therefore estimated. It differs from the basic Mark IV Model only in two 
ways: (a) The variables listed in  table 8.2 for those five countries for 
which the oil variables were significant (United States, United Kingdom, 
France, Japan, and the Netherlands) are added to the real income equa- 
tions. These five countries are listed with their estimated coefficients in 
table 8.4. (6) Corresponding identities are added to define the logarithm 
of the domestic price of oil as the sum of the logarithms of the dollar price 
and the purchasing power ratio. 
32.  In a dynamic simulation, the input series are the exogenous variables plus the initial 
conditions (endogenous variables at the beginning of the simulation). The values of endoge- 
nous variables within the simulation period are assigned their predicted values. Dynamic 
instabilities become important in the Mark IV-FLT  Model after seven quarters as discussed 
in chapter 7. These instabilities  apparently  arise from our inability to eliminate simul- 
taneous equation bias in the short estimation period. Therefore the previous caveat that 








Fig. 8.5  Logarithmic increase in U.S. real price of  oil from 19731. 
Figures 8.6 and 8.7 illustrate the simulation results for the five coun- 
tries with reliable data. The basic Mark IV Model is used to simulate the 
effects of  the oil price increase as displayed in figure 8.6 for six major 
macroeconomic variables for each country. The effect is estimated as the 
difference between the simulation values based on the actual real price of 
oil  and  the values  based  on a  constant  post-19731 price.  Figure  8.7 
displays the corresponding  simulated  effects when  the Mark  IV-Oil 
Model is used to perform the basic simulations. 
Figure 8.6  illustrates that in the basic model without direct real income 
effects, real income (panel a) generally rises due to increases in export 
demand (panel e). Whether this raises or lowers the price level depends 
on the simulated movements in interest rates (and so the net change in 
real money demand) and in the nominal money supply.” The money 
33. Recall that P = M”/m“(y,R).  Increases in real income tend to raise ma  and hence 
lower the price level, other things equal. Increases in M”  or in R,  on the other hand, tend by 
themselves to raise the price level. 256  Chapter Eight 
Table 8.4  Alternative Real-Income Equations for Mark IV-Oil  Model 
a) Equation Form 
Note. The country index isj, logy:  is permanent income, and log 0, = log PRO + log PI + 
log Ej -  log 6,  where PI and 6  are the price levels for the U.S.  and countryj, respectively, 
E, is the exchange rate, and PRO  is the index of the real price of a barrel of  Venezuelan oil in 
1970 U.S. dollars. 
b)  Coefficients 
Values by Country (j) 
Coefficient 
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Notes. The Mark IV-Oil  Model replaces the real-income equations in the Mark IV-FLT 
Simulation Model with these five equations.  The only other changes are the addition of 
identities for the United  Kingdom,  France, Japan, and the  Netherlands  defining their 
domestic real price of  oil as 
A coefficient for a suppressed variable (t  statistic less than 1  in absolute value; aj3  through 
aj,14  only) is indicated by dash. 
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1973  1974  1975 
Fig. 8.6  Simulated effects of the 1973-74increase in the real price of oil 
using basic Mark  IV model. 
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Fig. 8.6 (continued) 
b)  Price level--log  P, 
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Fig. 8.7  Simulated  effects of the 1973-74 increase in the real price of oil 
using Mark IV oil model. 
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supply movements are generally small except in Germany where strong 
simulated balance-of-payments effects cause a sharp but temporary in- 
crease in nominal money. 
Figure 8.7 illustrates just how sensitive the results are to the inclusion 
of  direct real-income effects. Notice in panel a the considerable real- 
income declines which occur in the three countries (the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and the Netherlands) with direct real-income effects 
included. For the United States and the United Kingdom, the price level 
rises due to the lower real income and hence real money demand and, for 
the U.K. only, due to a rise in nominal money.” The anomalous fall in the 
Dutch price level occurs because of  a perverse, statistically insignificant 
negative coefficient on transitory income in the money-demand equation. 
For Canada and Germany the results differ little from the basic Mark IV 
simulations. 
These  simulation  results  illustrate  the  large  difference  it  makes 
whether or not we take at face value the estimated real-oil-price effects in 
the real-income equations: Real-income effects vary from slightly posi- 
tive to as much  as  -7%  by  the end of  1974. A smaller variation in 
simulated price-level effects also occurs in the alternative simulations. It 
is both the sorrow and challenge of  our nonexperimental science that 
other things were not held constant when the oil price change occurred. 
One factor which may explain the estimated real-income effects in 1973- 
74 was identified in section 8.2:  the coincidental removal of price controls 
in those countries for which real effects were found. Only much further 
research can show whether the large simulated effects in the Mark IV-Oil 
Model have a basis in reality or are the result of other changes-such  as 
price decontrol-occurring in the same period. 
8.4  Conclusions 
The effects on real income and the price level of the 1973-74 increases 
in the real price of oil are subject of strongly held but diverse opinions.3s 
Unfortunately the results of  this paper indicate that a wide range of 
opinions is indeed consistent with the data. Perhaps we should not be 
surprised that with effectively one degree of freedom it is difficult to have 
much confidence in  estimates of  both an oil price coefficient and its 
standard error. 
The oil price shock of  1979-80 will provide us data on a second major 
34. There is a significant rise in British money because only unemployment and not 
inflation is important. In the American case these factors are offsetting. 
35. Taking two of the best studies for the long-run U.S. real-income effect as examples, 
Norsworthy, Harper, and Kunze (1979, p. 412) report an average reduction in productivity 
growth of 0.18% per annum for 1973-78, which implies a total reduction in real income of 
0.9%,  while Rasche and Tatom (1980), in contrast, as reported in table 8.3,  estimate a 7.0% 
long-run effect. 270  Chapter Eight 
move in the real price of oil.%  But these data are unlikely to resolve the 
empirical question. It seems to me that a more fruitful avenue may be to 
develop quantitative measures of  the biases in official real output data 
due to price controls and then to see what oil price effects are estimated 
using these corrected data. This approach is feasible because price con- 
trols were generally imposed much before the oil price change. Thus 
historical  relations  between  labor  input,  electricity production,  car- 
loadings, and other physical unit series can be used to estimate the biases 
up to the oil price change. 
If  this chapter has demonstrated that the effects of  the real-oil-price 
increases in  1973-74  remain an open question and thus stimulates re- 
search toward answering it, then I will be amply recompensed for having 
to report such inconclusive conclusions. 
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